dinheiro falso super notas O BILL Super Bills, superbill, notas falsas de dólar levaram a mudar nota falsificação de dólar coréia do norte irã TERRORISMO – AS SUPER NOTES! supernotes, como identificar dolár falso,

QUAL DESTAS DUAS NOTAS DE US$ 100.00 É VERDADEIRA?

supernotecomapare.jpg

SIM, as novas notas de US$ 100.00 também já estão sendo falsificadas. Não adiantou nada, depois de 70 anos, serem lançadas outra família de notas de dólares. A falsificação continuou.

Vejam nos links abaixos, boas informações sobre os Super Bills e o Bill Terrorismo.

http://www.dailynk.com/english/read.php?cataId=nk00100&num=1043

http://www.nkeconwatch.com/2006/07/22/dprk-super-notes-are-of-super-quality/

http://stickynotes.squarespace.com/journal/2006/8/30/super-picture-of-a-supernote-counterfeit-.html

http://ajacksonian.blogspot.com/2006/07/web-of-supernote.html

Muitos leitores se perguntam o porquê de North Korea e Iran estarem na lista de países que praticam terrorismo de estado.

A razão mais grave é o suposto envolvimento destes países na produção em larga escala de notas (bilhetes de banco) de 100 dólares tão perfeitas que são praticamente impossíveis de serem identificadas como falsas: as Super Notes.

Quantas Super notas circulam no mundo? É mais que TOP SECRET. Alías, também é segredo de estado, o nome que o governo americano dá para os altos segredos.

O que aconteceria se algúm banco central europeu for inundado com notas falsas? O governo americano as trocaria? Porque o Banque de France não aceita trocar notas de US$ 100.00 há anos?

O que acontece com quem é pego com uma Super Nota?

Qual o impacto disto na economia mundial? O que pode acontecer?

Qual o verdadeiro motivo dos ataques especulativos ao dólar no sudeste asiático em 1997? Derrame de Super Notes? O falatório sobre armas nucleares da North Korea é só mesmo para desviar o fóco do problema?

Já são 20 longos anos de Super Notes! O que já foi feito contra isso? O que está por ser feito?

Lembram-se que na década de 1980, na Colômbia, as falsificações mais perfeitas eram vendidas por um preço mais alto?

Só agora começamos a entender o real motivo (preucação ou havia já supernotas naquela época?) do Presidente Nixon ter proibido, em 1971, a troca de dólares pelo ouro de Fort Knox.

Está começando realmente a aparecer Super Bonds? (títulos falsificados do tesouro americano).

Qual a ligação de North Korea e Iran com grupos terroristas convencionais (estes que soltam bombas)? Qual a ligação destes dois países com o tráfico internacional de drogas e de armas? São só estes dois países, os suspeitos de emitirem Super Notes?

Porque esta questão é tão pouca comentada no Brasil? É comentada em Portugal? Porque coloco esta questão para discussão e comentários? No mínimo para contribuir para o debate!

palavras chave: dólares falsos, dólar falso, dólares falsificados.

Este site tinha fotos mas foi apagado. os demais eu salvei :

http://www.dprkstudies.org/2006/07/28/north-korea-shifting-from-super-notes-to-super-bonds/

http://www.korea-is-one.org/spip.php?article2796

=

The Daily NK reports  “In order to confirm whether or not recently North Korean counterfeit dollar bills are circulating, DailyNK purchased a super-note from a governmental trader in North Korea again following last January. “The counterfeit dollar bills made in 2001 begin with the serial number ‘C’, and most elaborate ones made in 2003 begin with ‘D’. The counterfeit dollar bills beginning with ‘D’ is most circulating super-notes”. Subsequently, he said that, “Because the U.S plans to issue new 100 dollar bills, the great quantity of the counterfeit dollar bills is very likely to be distributed and circulated”.

Apparently a supernote costs $70 to purchase.  Of interest – in N Korea, these supernotes are called “income currency”. The N Korean won (dollar) is so low in value and it takes so many to haul around, merchants have taken to using the counterfeit money because they know the value and it takes fewer to make a transaction.

Posted on Wednesday, August 30, 2006 at 05:47AM by Registered CommenterSTICKY NOTES in , , , | Comments2 Comments | References6 References

=

Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Germany
The Secret of America’s Counterfeit ’Supernotes’
“America’s accusations against North Korea are on very shaky ground … A rumor has circulated for years among representatives of the security printing industry and counterfeiting investigators that it is the American CIA that prints the Supernotes at a secret printing facility.”

By Klaus W. Bender [Translated By Armin Broeggelwirth

For the international police authority Interpol, the case is of the highest priority. For nearly 20 years and in great quantities, counterfeit 100-Dollar-Notes of impeccable quality have been in circulation. Interpol has been looking to find the source of the notes, but so far has been unable to identify it.

In March 2005, Interpol issued a so-called “orange notice.” With an “orange notice,” Interpol member countries are notified of a special threat situation. At the end of July 2006, Interpol hosted a crisis conference for central banks, police investigators and members of the high security printing industry over the Supernotes.

The Americans believe they know the perpetrators: the communist dictatorship of North Korea, archenemy of the United States. But at the end of the one-day conference, doubts emerged about this accusation. Worse still: A rumor emerged that the Americans themselves could be behind the forgeries.

Diplomats with wads of cash in their luggage

Since the first counterfeit 100-Dollar-Federal-Reserve-Note was discovered at a bank in Manila, Philippines in 1989, there has been great excitement about the issue. Even experts on currency printing have been unable, using visual inspection and touch-testing – the most important tests of authenticity for average citizens – to differentiate the counterfeit 100-Dollar-Notes from the genuine ones. With respect, investigators therefore baptized the forged notes as Supernotes.

At that time (1989), several countries were suspected, including the Iranian Mullahs, Syria, Lebanon’s Hezbullah, and also the former East Germany. Washington doesn’t like to be reminded of this, because today it is convinced that it must be North Korea

Possible evidence of this is that North Korean diplomats and businessmen with diplomatic passports have been intercepted over the years with huge bundles of Supernotes in their luggage. In addition, North Korean defectors have spoken of a state-directed counterfeit money operation. But the reliability of these statements is open to question.

Self-censorship of the U.S. media

Principal witness for this version is a former North Korean economic attaché to Moscow, who in 1998 was caught with $30,000 of Supernotes in the Russian city of Vladivostok. In 2003 he defected to the West and reported that the counterfeiting operation was run for the benefit of Dictator Kim Jong-il’s private wallet, and that he was personally involved and responsible for the production of the Supernotes.

Since that time, people in Washington have believed that Kim Jong-il not only finances his French Cognac and his missile and nuclear weapons program with Supernotes, but that the forgeries are all that keeps his entire bankrupt economic system from collapsing. America claims to know that Supernotes valued at $250 million are printed in North Korea and brought into circulation every year. Doubts about this are not permitted; the entire American media landscape has self-censored itself over this explosive topic.

Made with cotton from the American South

The printing of bank notes is an extremely complex technical venture. It is hard for the layperson to imagine the expertise required to produce counterfeit money of the quality of the Supernotes. The banknote paper used for the Supernotes is produced on a so-called Fourdrinier papermaking machine and consists of 75 percent cotton and 25 percent linen. Only the Americans make their currency in this manner.

On the Supernotes, neither super-thin polyester security film with the microprint “USA 100″ nor the graduated watermarks are missing. For this, the counterfeiters would require at least one papermaking machine. In addition, a chemical and physical analysis of the paper proves that the cotton used in the Supernotes originated in America’s Southern States. To be sure, this cotton is freely available on the open market.

First conterfeits with intaglio (raised) print

Other than the Nazi counterfeit operation of the British Pound note during World War II, in the long history of currency counterfeiting the Supernote is the first ever produced using Intaglio printing . The Supernotes have a perfectly perceptible Intaglio raised print. Therefore, to print such Supernotes, one requires an Intaglio printing press, which is manufactured only by KBA Giori (former DLR Giori) in Wuerzburg, Germany , which the American Federal Reverse and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing have used for years to print the dollar.

These special printing machines are not available on the open market. Even the resale of such a machine is reported to Interpol as a matter of routine. In the 1970s, North Korea did possess a standard printing press from the last century, which was indeed manufactured by KBA in Wuerzburg, Germany. But experts say that such a printer would be unable to produce a Supernote without additional equipment. And because of a lack of spare parts, North Korea’s printer has been out of order for some time. Today, China is likely printing the currency for its neighbor.

Security inks from highly secure factories

Charges that North Korea secretly procured a modern printing press from KBA Giori during the 1990s are an invention. Pyongyang has been trying to buy new printing presses in Europe, but so far has had no success – if only because it never paid in full for its old standard press.

Forensic analysis by a criminal laboratory shows that the security inks used for the Supernotes are identical to those used in genuine notes. That applies even to the expensive OVI color-changing ink, which alters its appearance depending upon angle of the incidence of light; the dollar changes from bronze-green to black.

The top-secret OVI ink is produced exclusively by Sicpa of Lausanne, Switzerland . The exclusive inks used by the Federal Reserve are mixed by the American licensee in high-security factories in the United States. This applies to all security inks used in U.S. dollars.

It however cannot be discounted that despite strict controls on the production process, small quantities of these special inks could have been stolen. But it’s interesting to ask how the quantities needed for mass production could have gone unnoticed and how the material could have been smuggled across strongly-guarded national borders. It is however true that North Korea was once a customer of Sicpa.

Whether Supernotes are printed with genuine inks is easily verified by Sicpa. A secret tagging system allows the backward-tracing of the security ink to the exact production date. Sicpa has refused comment because America is its largest customer.

Pyongyang connection

Another peculiarity concerning dollar notes that emerged starting in 1996 is that every variation implemented by the Fed in the printing of the dollar has been immediately replicated by the counterfeiters. At present, no less than 19 different plates for the Supernotes have been identified, and they are absolutely perfect. Micro-printing sized at only 1/42,000 of an inch are hidden on the new notes, and under a magnifying glass the Supernotes show no deviation from the original. Where ever did the counterfeiters find such specialists?

Washington’s thesis of a “Pyongyang Connection” and “economic warfare against America” are not widely believed. Strangely, although the counterfeiters have mastered the technology of the infrared sensitive security inks used on the new Supernotes, the notes are produced in such way that automated currency test systems recognize them immediately as forgeries. In America, the Supernotes have little chance of going undetected. Also suspicious is the fact that the 50-Dollar Supernote, which is even more finely crafted that the 100-Dollar Supernote, is not being circulated by the forgers, even though this denomination is far more widely used by the general public and often goes untested.

A failed investment; the printing press

If the North Koreans sought economic advantage by counterfeiting Supernotes, then the enterprise must be considered a classic bad investment. According to data from the American secret service, which is responsible for dealing with the counterfeiting of currency, only $50 million worth of Supernotes have been confiscated in the 17 years of their existence. But Kim Jong-il couldn’t even buy one of the printing presses he would need for less then $50 million.

Neither can counterfeit currency investigators in Europe confirm that the Supernotes come primarily from East Asia. In Europe, these counterfeit notes are routinely removed from circulation after automated inspection by banks. The Supernotes are thought to originate mostly in the Middle East, East Africa and also Russia.

From these countries, it is assumed, the false bank notes could have reached North Korea in the course of weapons sales. Japan previously maintained the most intense economic relations with North Korea. But over the years, Japanese police have never been able to confirm an increase in the circulation of the Supernotes. Just the opposite is true, in fact.

Secret CIA printing facility

South Korean police have stated that indeed, on several occasions in Seoul, considerable quantities of counterfeit dollar notes have been found in the possession of people from Shenyang and Dadong, Chinese cities near the North Korean border. But according to the South Korea police, the last time they detained a North Korean diplomat carrying large quantities of Supernotes occurred many years ago.

America’s accusations against North Korea are therefore on very shaky ground. And now the pendulum swings back: A rumor has circulated for years among representatives of the security printing industry and counterfeiting investigators that it is the American CIA that prints the Supernotes at a secret printing facility. It is in this facility, thought to be in a city north of Washington D.C., where the printing presses needed to produce the Supernotes is said to be located.

The CIA could use the Supernotes to fund covert operations in international crisis zones, and such funds would not be subject to any control by the American Congress. One could comfortably lay the blame for the counterfeit money operation at the feet of Pyongyang’s arch enemy.

Supposedly ’indiscutable evidence’

For a decade and a half, the Supernotes were of interest only to counterfeit money investigators. But by officially accusing Pyongyang for the first time, President George W. Bush made the issue a cornerstone of his policy on the Korean Peninsula. Washington allegedly has “indisputable evidence,” but has refused to disclose it for security reasons.

Such a publication is long overdue. Otherwise the public could see parallels to the events that lead to the Iraq War in 2003. At the time, the Americans spoke of “indisputable evidence” that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction to justify their invasion. Afterwards, they had to admit that their “indisputable evidence” was wrong.

(Germany – Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, January 8, 2006)

=

26 July 2006

The web of the supernote

My thanks to Austin Bay for his article on supernotes (superdollars) which is a quick look at a NYT Sunday Magazine (23 JUL 2006) article on same. It appears that North Korea, in its infinite joy of bollixing up anything it can think of, has decided to counterfeit US $100 bank notes. If you were wondering *why* the US dollar changed in composition, you can finger NoKo for this as they have decided that destabilizing the USD in small Nations and making the paper dollar untrustworthy would diminish the stance of the United States as a whole. Now, synthesizing a bit with the past work on Transnational Terrorism and it’s interconnectivity, we can start to piece together the directly known and highly suspected pieces and see what that leads to, if anything.

First is the Known Source: North Korea. They purchased the necessary presses and new variable printing dye technology about the same time as other Nations did. They bought an ink-type that changes from green to magenta while the US one goes from green to black. As a personal note in this, beyond the fact that a dark magenta can do a quick tomfoolery on the eye and look black, as noted elsewhere, a chemical analysis of the ink and its structure should also allow a nefarious Nation with spare time and manpower on its hands to figure out how to do a slight rework so that it goes from green to black. And the notes are actually *too* perfect, as the article explains, actually having higher definition on background items than the REAL dollar bill, thus giving a warning that the Treasury Department will have to make its game significantly more complex to defeat the forgers. The duplicates use the same paper and mix and anti-counterfeit strand mix as the real notes, the same processing techniques, the same drying techniques and duplicate the printing cycle of these notes. Needless to say, North Korea has denied doing this.

The distribution methodology is various and dispersed.

The first source being North Korean diplomats who get a 50/50 mix of real and forged notes for their foreign travels. Thus these notes have a wide, but limited distribution and are at a low level. So if you have ever seen North Korean diplomats and such out at a party passing out $100 bills, the chances are half of them are forged. And only an expert can tell the difference, and then often only with forensic tools. So the first evidence of these things were just one here, then another there, but no cumulative effort made at wide-spread distribution. Just a way to make the NoKo diplomats get a simple pay raise with no effort, I guess.

One of the first noticed individuals (though not appearing on the US Treasury’s designated nationals and blocked persons list) in this is Sean Garland of the Official IRA which is yet another IRA offspring.

As in my previous offering it is time to look at the connections of the OIRA:
USSR/Russia – Defector Vasili Mitrokhin alleges that the OIRA sought arms from the KGB (approximately 70 rifles, some handguns and explosives). Some of this may have found its way to the Aldershot Bombing.

Now, where did Mr. Garland meet up with the North Koreans? Why in Moscow where he went to their Embassy. So lets scribble out that *suspected* link to the KGB purported by Mr. Mitrokhin and put in *highly likely* if not *quite certain*. He had then planned to exchange these notes for real ones in Dublin and Birmingham for either pounds or authentic dollars. This does add North Korea into the previous Template of Terror posting and gives a valid reasoning for considering them to be a backer of Transnational Terrorism directly via this route. This also gives a clear indication of linkage between the KGB and North Korea, as it is very, very, very unlikely that the KGB would not know of supernotes being distributed by North Korea.

Second up is the supernotes turning up in the Bekaa Valley in 2000. At that point it was under Syrian control, although Hezbollah operated there and is a direct link to Iran. Iran was the first Nation suspected of forging these notes, but the limited activity made that of questionable import. And at this point that makes the Bekaa Valley only a distribution point for the supernotes, not a true source (although recent events may prove a technology transfer). Iran, though easily suspected, actually has little need for this sort of thing, and anything that would start to make folks in the region uneasy about how they paid their bills would not look good to Iran. Thus we are left with Syria, which was left high and dry after the demise of the Soviet Union, having few natural resources to exploit and being, basically, cash strapped. Now, how does one help to fund a terrorist organization and one’s military at the same time? Why, pay the terrorists with FORGED notes! While this is *not* confirmatory, it does form a reasonable supposition that Syria and North Korea conspired, each for their own reasons, to do this.

This would be one of the hardest links between Syria and North Korea made for the supernote trade, if proven to be true. Although what North Korea got out of it is unknown, save that Iran had been working on upgrading long range missiles they got from China. So a bit of triangular trade with Iran giving plans to Syria, Syria exchanging plans to North Korea in exchange for counterfeit supernotes and then paying off Hezbollah as proxy for Iran, thus satisfying all parties. This may be re-enforced by the US Treasury Department’s look at Commercial Bank of Syria (CBS), along with its subsidiary Syrian Lebanese Commercial Bank for trafficking with terrorists a via the UN Oil For Food scandal and one wonders if the Syrians were using their own banks for laundering supernotes.

The US looked at Chinese banking, which is natural given Chinese support of North Korea. Eventually one bank, Banco Delta Asia, came up on the prohibition listing from the Treasury Department. And here is where that bank operates:

“Banco Delta Asia is located and licensed in the Macau Special Administrative Region, China. The bank operates eight branches in Macau, including a branch at a casino, and is served by a representative office in Japan. In addition, Banco Delta Asia maintains correspondent accounts in Europe, Asia, Australia, Canada, and the United States.”

This fine establishment has been serving North Korea for banking purposes for 20 years and have given little or no oversight to the dealings of North Korea as it is one of their largest if not THE largest customer they have. Further, senior officials of the bank are working with North Korea in counterfeit operations. A North Korean front company makes near exclusive use of the bank and that company has been cited for being involved with the international narcotics trade and uses the bank for money laundering operations. So the banking realm of State sponsored terrorism is to be included, as well as front companies compromising legitimate banking transactions to launder this money.

Looking further afield into the criminal side of things we have testimony from William Bach from the State Department’s Director, Office of Asian, African and European Affairs, to the Senate committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget and International Security on 20 MAY 2003 on the doings of North Korea. NoKo has been involved with the trade of : methamphetamines, endangered species, heroin, counterfeit cigarettes, and the supernote. There is a laundry list of Nations involved as end points for these activities: Japan, Taiwan, Australia, South Korea, Russia, and China to name a few. The testimony then goes on with:

“North Korean traffickers have links to Russian, Japanese, Taiwanese, China-Hong Kong, and Thai organized crime elements. In all cases, the relationship began as one of “wholesaler” with “retailer.” North Koreans with large quantities of drugs to sell have sold them to criminal groups with the retail network necessary to move the drugs to consumers. It appears that some organized crime elements (e.g., Yakuza, Triads) approached the North Koreans because they knew that the North Koreans had drugs to sell.

This “wholesaler-retailer” relationship seems to have evolved in recent years. Incidents such as the Pong Su arrests, for example, demonstrate that North Korean traffickers are becoming involved farther down the trafficking chain.”

All of which the good North Koreans attribute to ‘plot breeding‘ by the CIA and Japan.

A bit further afield is the Council on Foreign Relations which has a nice little page on North Korea and its connections to other terrorist States and its own terrorist activities, which would allow yet another means to unaccountably launder this money via another illegal trafficking setup different from mere criminal networks. This list includes: Iran, Syria and Libya as well as Pakistan and Yemen. From this we can show the definitive connections necessary for North Korea to infiltrate its supernotes into the banking system as a whole.

So the basic routes of this are: North Korean diplomats and other individuals doing deals with North Korea, pay off on information and other things to other Nations involved with terrorism and illegal drugs with this money thus putting them into the hands of the criminal underworld and terrorists (who might not like the fact that their money is proven worthless unless they can further launder it through their own banks), use legitimate banks and front companies to launder the supernotes.

Now they may only have a few $10’s Million in circulation, but your average AK-47 is $300-$800 with a bit of fanciness to get you up to the high class $1,000 models. And your average RPG-7 launcher costs about $100-$500 each with each anti-tank warhead about $50-$100 each. So even $10,000 is enough to get a few folks started on the road to cheap jihad. This stuff is damned cheap, courtesy of the global armaments and export market, and the fact the AK-47 is so easy to manufacture that village blacksmiths can easily make spare parts and even whole weapons using a single original as a template. Those low-end, hand made in a village ones are on the low end of cost and reliability, but they still get the job done.

Some suppositional dot connecting –

  • So, one series of ‘dots’ leads this way: North Korea – Syria – Hezbollah – Bekaa Valley, with Iran as part of a triangular trade.
  • Another series of ‘dots’ leads this way: North Korean diplomats – Official IRA – UK Banks for money laundering.
  • A third series of ‘dots’ could lead to: North Korea – Pakistan (most likely its Secret Service) – then to the Taliban/ Kashmiri separatists/ al Qaeda.
  • Another series of ‘dots’: North Korea – Pakistan (AQ Khan nuclear weapons, equipment and information exchange) – then to Taliban/ Kashmiri separatists/ al Qaeda. Note that this one gets North Korea validated nuclear designs for warheads, as well as processing techniques and information.
  • Another series of ‘dots’: North Korea – Libya (nuclear information and components) – AQ Khan network. In this case the supernotes would be circulating back into the underground nuclear market.
  • And a fun series of ‘dots’ building off of the Template of Terror work: North Korea diplomats – Soviet KGB – Aum Shinrikyo. This uses the KGB as a filtration service to get work on anthrax, sarin and other capabilities developed by Aum. Now, this is backed up by this article, which points to these connections, but does not take into account that what Aum was buying was manufacturing blueprints and such, and very little in the way of actual components and weapons. Aum wanted to *manufacture* these things, not buy them off the shelf. What Aum offered was high level technical expertise which points to their own, homegrown, anthrax production methodology which actually did produce weaponized anthrax spores. That could have been the back play into North Korea to improve its already existing capabilities. And North Korea was able to get at least one individual sympathetic to it within Aum which would serve as another conduit for information.
  • Another set of ‘dots’ starts elsewhere: Iraq under Saddam – terrorist connections to al Qaeda and the Taliban – Pakistan (Secret Service) – North Korea. Here the passage is Iraqi chemical and bio weapons manuals being shifting and North Korea using the AQ Khan compromise of the Pakistani Secret Service to get at this material. They could also get their hands on generalized training documents and counter-espionage capability that Saddam was providing to both the Taliban and al Qaeda.

What this brings into focus is that even though these are ‘suppositional’ dot connections, they are *not* outside the realm of possibility nor even unreasonable. North Korea, by having a limited, but high class manufacturing sector can produce extremely pure drugs for illegal sale (heroin, methamphetamines, viagra) which is far more pure than what can be done by criminal organizations. This capability also gives North Korea the ability to manufacture supernotes and equipment to the highest of technical standards. Their main limitation is the lack of a real industrial base, and so they seek to leverage their extremely limited capabilities as much as possible and create enough currency flow to build their illegal trade. As a source point for high capability industrial techniques North Korea is a menace in the State sponsored terrorism business.

The main problem with Transnational Terrorism is not the actual terrorism… it is the web that fosters it and allows it to grow unaccountably outside the realm of legitimate State control and oversight. One can play ‘whack-a-mole’ with al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, PLO, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc., but until this interconnected network of illicit trade sponsored by outlaw States is *ended* that is all the Civilized world will be doing.

Cutting off the top of the weed and *not* getting at its root system.

To kill the roots one must have real Goals in the Global War on Terror, and be willing to use the most powerful assymetric warfare tool available to the United States. Until the roots of this problem are squarely addressed and the internetworking between terrorists and States eliminated, the World will ALWAYS be in 9/10.

Posted by A Jacksonian on Wednesday, July 26, 2006  

AddThis Social Bookmark Button

=

DPRK super notes are of super quality

From the New York Times (via NK Zone):

The counterfeits were nearly flawless. They featured the same high-tech color-shifting ink as genuine American bills and were printed on paper with the same precise composition of fibers. The engraved images were, if anything, finer than those produced by the United States Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Only when subjected to sophisticated forensic analysis could the bills be confirmed as imitations.

Counterfeits of this superior sort — known as supernotes — had been detected by law-enforcement officials before, elsewhere in the world, but the Newark shipment marked their first known appearance in the United States, at least in such large quantities. Federal agents soon seized more shipments. Three million dollars’ worth arrived on another ship in Newark two months later; and supernotes began showing up on the West Coast too, starting with a shipment of $700,000 that arrived by boat in Long Beach, Calif., in May 2005, sealed in plastic packages and wrapped mummy-style in bolts of cloth.

In the weeks and months that followed, federal investigators rounded up a handful of counterfeiting suspects in a series of operations code-named Royal Charm and Smoking Dragon. This past August, in the wake of the arrests, Justice Department officials unsealed indictments in New Jersey and California that revealed that the counterfeits were purchased and then seized as part of an operation that ensnared several individuals accused of being smugglers and arms traffickers, some of whom were suspected of having connections to international crime rings based in Southeast Asia.

The arrests also prompted a more momentous accusation. After the indictments were released, U.S. government and law-enforcement officials began to say in public something that they had long said in private: the counterfeits were being manufactured not by small-time crooks or even sophisticated criminal cartels but by the government of North Korea. “The North Koreans have denied that they are engaged in the distribution and manufacture of counterfeits, but the evidence is overwhelming that they are,” Daniel Glaser, deputy assistant secretary for terrorist financing and financial crimes in the Treasury Department, told me recently. “There’s no question of North Korea’s involvement.”

Last September, the Treasury Department took action to signal its displeasure. The department announced that it was designating Banco Delta Asia, a bank in Macao with close ties to North Korea, a “primary money-laundering concern,” a declaration that ultimately led to the shutting down of the bank and the freezing of several key overseas accounts belonging to members of North Korea’s ruling elite. In a public statement, Treasury officials accused Banco Delta Asia of facilitating North Korea’s illicit activities by, among other things, accepting “large deposits of cash” from North Korea, “including counterfeit U.S. currency, and agreeing to place that currency into circulation.”

The counterfeiting of American currency by North Korea might seem, to some, to be a minor provocation by that country’s standards. North Korea, after all, has exported missile technology in blatant disregard of international norms; engaged in a decades-long campaign of kidnapping citizens of other countries; abandoned pledges not to pursue nuclear weapons; and most recently, on July 4, launched ballistic missiles in defiance of warnings from several countries, including the United States.

But several current and former Bush administration officials whom I spoke with several months ago maintain that the counterfeiting is in important ways a comparable outrage. Michael Green, a former point man for Asia on the National Security Council, told me that in the past, counterfeiting has been seen as an “act of war.” A current senior administration official, who was granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of relations between the United States and North Korea, agreed that the counterfeiting could be construed by some as a hostile act against another nation under international law and added that the counterfeits, by creating mistrust in the American currency, posed a “threat to the American people.”

Whether counterfeiting constitutes an economic threat, the issue of North Korean counterfeiting is aggravating diplomatic relations between the two countries. According to some analysts, the freezing of North Korea’s bank accounts helps explain the regime’s decision to launch its missiles on July 4. Bill Richardson, the governor of New Mexico and a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, visited North Korea last fall, not long after the Treasury Department’s crackdown. When I spoke with him in mid-July, he said that the missile launch was in part a protest of the department’s actions. “When I was in Pyongyang in October,” he said, “my interlocutor raised the counterfeiting issue and the freezing of the assets as a major irritant for the government.” He continued, “The counterfeiting issue, and the crackdown on Banco Delta Asia, is a major factor which is contributing to Kim Jong Il’s posturing.”

How much of a concern should the counterfeiting be? Is it worth adding the issue to an already volatile diplomatic situation? The current South Korean government, which has made détente with North Korea a centerpiece of its foreign policy, has shied away from an open confrontation with the regime over the issue. Even many American law-enforcement officials who are upset that North Korea is counterfeiting nonetheless question the view that the counterfeiting poses an urgent threat. In Congressional testimony delivered in April, Michael Merritt, deputy assistant director of investigations for the Secret Service, which is responsible for protecting the nation’s currency from counterfeiters, said that the supernote was “unlikely to adversely impact the U.S. economy based on the comparatively low volume of notes passed.”

The Bush administration, though, is taking a hard line. In response to a question after a speech in Philadelphia in December, President Bush himself suggested that counterfeiting is among the regime’s gravest affronts. “North Korea’s a country that has declared boldly they’ve got nuclear weapons,” he said. “They counterfeit our money. And they’re starving their people to death.”

Funny Money

In December 1989, while counting a stack of $100 bills, an experienced money handler in the Central Bank of the Philippines became suspicious about one bill in particular. It passed the usual tests for authenticity but still felt a bit odd. The bill eventually found its way to the offices of the United States Secret Service. All counterfeits sent to the Secret Service headquarters, in Washington, are examined under a microscope, scrutinized in ultraviolet light and otherwise dissected to reveal their flaws and shortcomings, as well as the printing techniques used in their manufacture. This information is then cross-checked with a database of all known counterfeits.

As the mystery note underwent the usual scrutiny, it became apparent that this was no ordinary counterfeit. For starters, it was printed on paper made with the appropriate mix of three-quarters cotton and one-quarter linen of real U.S. currency. Making secure paper with this mix requires a special paper-making machine rarely seen outside the United States.

In addition, the note was manufactured using an intaglio press, the most advanced form of currency-printing technology available. These intaglio presses are far more expensive than ordinary offset, typographic or lithograhic presses, which yield inferior counterfeits. An intaglio press coats the printing plates with ink, and then wipes the surface clean, leaving behind ink in the recesses of the engraving. The press then brings paper and plate together under pressure, so that the ink is forced out of the recessed lines and deposited on the paper in relief. While counterfeits made using the intaglio process had been seen on rare occasions before, this note surpassed all of them in the quality of the engraving.

As with other new species of counterfeits arriving in the offices of the Secret Service, the bill was given its own flat-file drawer and christened with a sequential number: C-14342. In time, its remarkable quality earned it its more informal honorific: the supernote. But as soon became clear, the supernote was merely one member of a family of counterfeit notes. Technicians at the Secret Service soon linked it to another intaglio note detected around the same time, C-14403. This counterfeit had a few defects that the note from the Philippines did not, suggesting it was manufactured before C-14342. Nonetheless, C-14342 was soon known by the name Parent Note 14342, or PN-14342.

The Secret Service has drawn up what looks like a genealogical chart of these and related bills, which agents showed me during a visit to their Washington offices this spring. The chart displays the many members of the supernote clan: C-21555, for example, the first “big head” $100 (so-called because of the design of the most recent U.S. bills), which was initially identified in London; and C-22500, a more recent arrival that appeared in Macao. The family, which now has 19 members and remains unparalleled even in the world of high-quality counterfeits, also includes two $50 notes: C-20000, a small-head supernote that appeared in Athens, in June 1995; and C-22160, a big-head version, first sighted in Sofia, Bulgaria.

Thanks to sophisticated tools, including mass spectroscopy and near-infra-red analysis, along with old-fashioned visual inspection, the labs of the Secret Service have established genetic links between the family members. These links are not a matter of resemblance so much as they are an indication of a common ancestry: the notes in the PN-14342 family have been created by an individual or an organization using the same equipment and the same materials, and most likely operating from a single location.

As the number of supernotes multiplied, the question arose: who created them? In theory, only governments can buy intaglio printing presses used for making money, and only a handful of companies sell them. Those facts alone pointed toward government involvement, but for some time there was no consensus as to which nation was behind the counterfeiting. Many of the supernotes surfaced in the Middle East, notably in the Bekaa Valley of Lebanon and in Tehran. In 1992, Bill McCollum, a Florida congressman and chairman of the House Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, issued a report accusing Iran of printing the supernotes. The report estimated that the value of supernotes in circulation might eventually approach “billions.”

The Secret Service, however, distanced itself from this accusation. In a letter written in 1995 in response to a Government Accounting Office report on counterfeiting overseas, the Secret Service called the task force’s allegations “unsubstantiated” and characterized its conclusions as being based on “rumor and innuendo.” In reality, evidence was pointing elsewhere.

A Picture Emerges

With a country as closed and secretive as North Korea, information about government activities is hard to come by. But in the late 1990’s, a new source of information arrived in the form of defectors. Starvation, corruption and desperation had prompted thousands of North Koreans, many of them government officials, to flee the country. In 1997, two high-ranking bureaucrats — Hwang Jang Yop, a former secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party, and Kim Duk Hong, head of a government trading company — sought political asylum at the South Korean Embassy in Beijing. They were the most prominent officials to defect, but they were hardly alone: thousands of North Koreans have fled to South Korea. Many thousands more have escaped to China.

In the international intelligence community, vetting accounts from defectors about activities in North Korea soon became a specialty — as well as a necessity, for the accounts were not always reliable. Raphael Perl, an analyst at the Congressional Research Service who has written extensively on North Korea’s counterfeiting operations, told me that “a lot of defectors or refugees give us information, but they tell us anything we want to know. You have to question the reliability of what they say.”

Nonetheless, the most trustworthy of these accounts, when combined with more traditional intelligence sources, permitted a best guess of what might be happening in North Korea. And as far as counterfeiting was concerned, the picture that emerged suggested that moneymaking had long been a passion for the country’s dictatorial ruler, Kim Jong Il, dating back to the 1970’s, years before he took over the reins of power from his father, the country’s founder and first president, Kim Il Sung.

Today, on Changgwang Street in Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea, there is a barricaded compound of government buildings. Judging from satellite photos, these are unremarkable, rectangular structures that suggest no special purpose. Yet according to a North Korean specialist based in Seoul whom I spoke with recently, and who has interviewed many high-ranking North Korean defectors, including Hwang Jang Yop and Kim Duk Hong, these buildings are the home of Office 39, a government bureau devoted to raising hard currency for Kim Jong Il. (The specialist was granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of relations between North and South Korea.)

While the operatives of Office 39 may well direct legitimate enterprises, including the export of exotic mushrooms, ginseng and seaweed, a substantial portion of the office’s revenue comes from its involvement in illicit activities: drug manufacturing and trafficking, sales of missile technology, counterfeit cigarettes and counterfeit $50 and $100 bills. According to Ken Gause, director of the Foreign Leadership Studies Program at the CNA Corporation, a policy group in Virginia that consults on national-security issues, the activities of Office 39 overlap with those of two other offices that occupy buildings in the same complex. The first, Office 38, manages the money acquired by Office 39, he said, while the second, Office 35, handles kidnappings, assassinations and other such activities.

All three divisions employ the same narrow coterie of elites, and all answer directly to Kim Jong Il, who lives in a villa less than a mile away. The history of the operations of Offices 39, 38 and 35, Gause told me, closely follows Kim Jong Il’s own rise to power through the party apparatus. In the early 70’s, after helping his father purge the ranks of the Korean Workers’ Party of competing factions, Kim Jong Il assumed control of North Korea’s covert operations, mostly involving South Korean targets.

In the mid-70’s, according to defector accounts related to me by the North Korean specialist, Kim Jong Il issued a directive to members of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers’ Party instructing that expenses for covert operations against South Korea be paid for by producing and using counterfeit dollars. Officials in charge of the operation supposedly brought back $1 bills from abroad, bleached the ink and then used the blank paper to print fairly sophisticated counterfeit $100 bills — though nothing close in quality to a supernote. Many of these notes were later used by North Korean agents implicated in attacks on South Korean targets, like the operatives arrested for the bombings of a South Korean government delegation in Rangoon in 1983 and a Korean Airlines jet in 1987.

According to the same defector accounts, Kim Jong Il endorsed counterfeiting not only as a way of paying for covert operations but also as a means of waging economic warfare against the United States, “a way to fight America, and screw up the American economic system,” as the North Korean specialist paraphrased it to me.

In a similar vein, according to Sheena Chestnut, a specialist on North Korea’s illicit activities who has also interviewed several key defectors, counterfeiting was seen as an expression of the guiding idea of the regime: the concept of juche. Often loosely translated as “self-reliance” or “sovereignty,” the idea of juche entails an aggressive repudiation of other nations’ sovereignty — a reaction to the many centuries in which Korea capitulated to its larger, more powerful neighbors. “It appears that counterfeiting actually contributed to the domestic legitimacy of the North Korean regime,” Chestnut told me. “It could be justified under the juche ideology and allowed the regime to advertise its anticapitalist, anti-American credentials.”

By 1984, as North Korea’s planned economy began to fall apart, Kim Jong Il, who by that time was effectively running much of the government, issued another directive, according to the North Korean specialist, who told me he has obtained a copy of the document. It explained that “producing and using counterfeit U.S. dollars” was a means, in part, for “overcoming economic crisis.” The economic crisis was twofold: not only the worsening conditions among the general population but also a growing financial discontent among the regime’s elite, who had come to expect certain perquisites of power. Counterfeiting offered the promise of raising hard currency to buy the elite the luxury items that they had come to expect: foreign-made cars, trips for their children, fine wine and cognac.

Laundering, Wholesaling and Redesigning

Earlier this year, I visited David Asher, a former senior adviser for East Asian and Pacific affairs in the State Department and an outspoken critic of the North Korean regime. In late 2001, he explained to me, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly asked him to study why the North Korean regime had not collapsed, given that the country’s economy had declined even further over the previous decade, with industrial output alone falling by as much as three-quarters. Former Communist countries had ended their subsidies, Kim Il Sung had died, the country was stricken by floods and famine and the food-distribution system had collapsed. (Party slogans betrayed more than a hint of desperation: “Let’s Eat Two Meals a Day” was one of the era’s more uplifting exhortations.) Yet Kim Jong Il, defying all expectations, managed to cling to power.

“How this was happening was perplexing, given the huge trade gap, even with adjustments for aid flowing into the country,” Asher recalled. “Something just didn’t add up. It didn’t account for why Kim was driving around in brand new Mercedes-Benzes or handing out Rolexes at parties and purchasing truly large quantities of cognac.”

As Asher and his colleagues began amassing intelligence, evidence of an array of illicit activities began surfacing — everything from ivory smuggling to the production of high-grade methamphetamine. And counterfeiting was at the core. “The more we found out about this counterfeiting of dollars, the more we thought it was outrageous,” Asher told me. These activities provided what Asher calls “an alternative framework for existence” and “the palace economy of Kim Jong Il.”

In the spring of 2003, the State Department established the Illicit Activities Initiative, an interagency effort designed to investigate and counter North Korea’s criminal activities, and appointed Asher coordinator. The department began to systematically collect a variety of forensic and other evidence gathered by its own investigators, the Secret Service and elements of the intelligence community linking North Korea to the supernotes. (Asher declined to comment on the nature of the evidence, most of which remains classified.)

In addition, the department put together circumstantial evidence of North Korean counterfeiting that had been accumulating for more than a decade. In 1994, for example, authorities in Hong Kong and Macao apprehended five North Korean diplomats and trade-mission members carrying about $430,000 in bills that turned out to be counterfeits of the supernote variety. Additional North Korean diplomats, including an aide close to Kim Jong Il who was attached to Office 39, were caught trying to launder millions of dollars worth of supernotes over several years, prompting an increased scrutiny of North Korea’s diplomatic and trading missions.

Thwarted, the regime seems to have changed tactics, harnessing new distribution networks and wholesaling the counterfeits to third parties who would funnel them to criminal gangs. In the late 1990’s, for instance, British detectives began tracking Sean Garland, the leader of the Official Irish Republican Army, a Marxist splinter group of the I.R.A. According to an unsealed federal indictment in Washington, Garland began working with North Korean agents earlier in the decade, purchasing supernotes at wholesale prices before distributing them through an elaborate criminal network with outposts in Belarus and Russia, as well as Ireland. (Garland denies the charges and is currently fighting extradiction to the United States from Ireland.)

Details of the actual manufacture of counterfeit notes also began filtering into the State Department, much of the information derived from defector accounts. According to similar accounts compiled by Sheena Chestnut and the North Korean specialist in Seoul whom I spoke with, the regime obtained Swiss-made intaglio printing presses and installed them in a building called Printing House 62, part of the national-mint complex in Pyongsong, a city outside Pyongyang, where a separate team of workers manufactures the supernotes.

In 1996, frustrated by the high-quality imitations of its currency in worldwide circulation, the United States government redesigned the money for the first time since 1928. Out went the old-fashioned symmetrical designs, replaced by the big-head notes. Almost everything about the new design was aimed at frustrating potential counterfeiters, including a security thread embedded in the paper, a watermark featuring a shadow portrait of the figure on the bill and new “microprinting,” tiny lettering that is hard to imitate. The most significant addition was the use of optically variable ink, better known as O.V.I. Look at the bills in circulation today: all 10’s, 20’s, 50’s and 100’s now feature this counterfeiting deterrent in the denomination number on the lower-right-hand corner. Turn the bill one way, and it looks bronze-green; turn it the other way, and it looks black. O.V.I. is very expensive, costing many times more than conventional bank-note ink.

A Swiss company named SICPA is the major manufacturer of O.V.I., and the United States purchased the exclusive rights to green-to-black color-shifting ink in 1996. Other countries followed, purchasing color-shifting inks of different colors for their own currency. One of the first countries to do so, interestingly enough, was North Korea, whose currency, the won, counterfeiters ignore. North Korea purchased O.V.I. from SICPA that shifts from green to magenta. For the purposes of counterfeiting American currency, it would be a smart choice: magenta is the closest color on the spectrum to black. “The green-to-magenta ink can be manipulated to look very close to green-to-black ink,” Daniel Glaser of the Treasury Department told me. “They took this stuff the same year we went to O.V.I.” According to Glaser, the North Koreans managed to fiddle with the new ink, obtaining an approximation of the O.V.I. on the bills.

Though there is some dispute on the timing, the first counterfeit big-head supernotes might have arrived on the market as early as 1998. Like the earlier generation of supernotes, the big-head imitations show an ever-growing attention to detail. “They would certainly fool me,” said Glaser, who points out that the “defects” of the supernote are arguably improvements. He recalled looking at the back of a $100 supernote under a magnifying glass and noticing that the hands on the clock tower of Independence Hall were sharper on the counterfeit than on the genuine.

From all accounts, superb quality is a feature of much North Korean contraband: methamphetamine of extraordinarily high purity; counterfeit Viagra rumored to exceed the bona fide product in its potency; supernotes. It’s an impressive product line for a regime that can barely feed its people. When I discussed this with Asher, he let out a sigh. “I always say that if North Korea only produced conventional goods for export to the degree of quality and precision that they produce counterfeit United States currency, they would be a powerhouse like South Korea, not an industrial basket case.”

The Threat

How many supernotes are in circulation, and what sort of provocation do they represent?

Most government officials interviewed for this story declined to give an estimate, but several, including Michael Merritt of the Secret Service, noted that his agency has removed $50 million worth of supernotes from circulation. That is a far cry from the “billions” predicted by Representative Bill McCollum’s task force in the early 1990’s, and while it may still sound like a lot, it is insignificant relative to the $12 trillion dollar American G.D.P.

When supernotes are discovered in a smaller foreign economy that makes use of American currency, they can cause a local crisis of confidence in the dollar (this has happened in Taiwan and Ireland, for instance). But in the United States, the economic threat is minimal. For this reason, many analysts, particularly those outside the administration, like Raphael Perl of Congressional Research Service, express concern about making the issue into a diplomatic crisis. Perl, who agrees that the North Koreans are behind the counterfeiting, told me that because American government officials often view the violation of the currency as “a matter of national honor,” there is “an emotional factor that could get blown out of proportion.” In the process, he argued, counterfeiting can become conflated with other, more pressing problems posed by the North Korean regime, like its nuclear threat.

This conflation may also be deliberate. According to Kenneth Quinones, who was the North Korea country director in the State Department in the 1990’s, hawks in the current administration may be trying to use the counterfeiting issue to impede negotiations with the regime over its nuclear program. Critics of this approach note that the freezing of the North Korean bank accounts took place in the same month that participants in the six-party talks, the multination negotiations over North Korea’s nuclear program, hammered out an agreement that the regime would abandon its nuclear-weapons program. North Korea soon reneged on its promise to abandon its nuclear program and has since refused to rejoin the talks until the United States lifts the designation on Banco Delta Asia. The hawks, Quinones told me, “are attempting to use these sanctions” to help “bring down the regime.”

The senior administration official interviewed for this article dismissed that claim. “The notion that there was a grand conspiracy by hard-liners is just wrong,” he told me. “It’s not accurate. This was done as a law-enforcement action by appropriate U.S. government agencies based on the facts of the case.”

Even if the counterfeiting is not worthy of being a diplomatic issue unto itself, the fact that North Korea is counterfeiting may still serve as a grim reminder of the difficulty of good-faith negotiations with North Korea. Just consider that the supernotes that were seized by law-enforcement officials in New Jersey and California arrived in the United States while the six-party talks were going on. Asher, for one, was stunned by the audacity of the regime. “If they’re going to counterfeit our currency the entire time they’re engaged in diplomatic negotiations, what does that say about their sincerity?” he asked me. “How can they want normalization with a country whose currency they’re counterfeiting? How can they expect it?”

However the diplomatic standoff is resolved, Asher said that he believes North Korea won’t continue to counterfeit much longer. Next year, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing is issuing an updated version of the $100 bills. The notes will be expensive to manufacture, requiring the purchase of a new set of presses at a cost that Asher estimated in the “hundreds of millions” of dollars. The Treasury Department characterizes the next generation of notes as part of a routine redesign that it will undertake on a regular schedule every decade. But Asher has no illusions as to the timing. “It might be a routine update,” he said, “but it’s a routine update that’s being instigated by one country: North Korea.”

Stephen Mihm teaches history at the University of Georgia. He is at work on two books about the history of counterfeiting in the United States, one to be published by Harvard University Press and the other by HarperCollins.

=

ome > News Article > News
NK Super-Notes Still Circulating …Reconfirmed on the SpotPossible to Purchase Counterfeit Dollar Bills from Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces
By Kwon Jeong Hyun, Dandong of China
[2006-08-30 18:35 ]
Facebook  Twitter
▲ In August 29 2006, the person in charge of counterfeit dollar bills at Global Standard KEB is judging a $100 bill a super-note ⓒDailyNK

It was confirmed that even in the recent situation that the U.S has imposed an additional sanction against North Korea, super-notes have been circulating in and around North Korea. Super-notes are most delicately made counterfeit dollar bills.

In order to confirm whether or not recently North Korean counterfeit dollar bills are circulating, DailyNK purchased a super-note from a governmental trader in North Korea again following last January.

Last 22nd, Cho Chun Ho(pseudonym, 38), businessman trading with North Korea in Dandong China, tapped on the possibility of purchasing counterfeit dollar bills. He said that, “If we try to contact with sellers first, they (traders belong to the department of the general rear management under North Korean Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces) will check out a few details about us”, and “so purchasing bills could take time”.

After two days, Cho Chun Ho called us and said that, “I asked them to give a sample of a super-note to me to show it to a purchaser”. “They trusted and gave me one because I have always traded with them. Even now, the quality of the counterfeit dollar bills are so good that we cannot purchase them at under 70 dollars”.

Cho also said that, “If you want to purchase a great quantity, I will connect you to them”, adding “they are the last products so that you had better hurry up”. ‘The last product’ seems to be related to the new 100 dollar bills plan of the U.S.

On the 28th, we revisited Global Standard KEB with the new super-note we purchased in Dandong. The person in charge of counterfeit dollar bills at Global Standard KEB judged it a super-note made in 2003. He added that, “recently such 5 or 6 super-notes have been reported”.

He said that, “the counterfeit dollar bills made in 2001 begin with the serial number ‘C’, and most elaborate ones made in 2003 begin with ‘D’. The counterfeit dollar bills beginning with ‘D’ is most circulating super-notes”. Subsequently, he said that, “Because the U.S plans to issue new 100 dollar bills, the great quantity of the counterfeit dollar bills is very likely to be distributed and circulated”.

In early January of this year, DailyNK purchased a super-note made in North Korea and Global Standard KEB judged it a super-note. Seo Tae Suk, the best counterfeit dollar bill discerner in Korea and work at Global Standard KEB stated that, “It must be the most recently issued super-note”.

Since the U.S financial sanction against North Korea, North Korea has feigned ‘to be ignorant’ about the counterfeit dollar manufacture. Last March, during a talk between the U.S and North Korea, it admitted its substantial responsibility and even suggested an association between North Korea and the U.S, yet there has been no progress.

On the 26th, in regards to the counterfeit dollar manufacture spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry of North Korea claimed that, “We set up a perfect legal and institutional environment to prevent the illegal activities such as forgery bills and money laundering”, adding, “We are not the counterfeiter and rather, the victim of the counterfeit dollar manufacture and circulation because of the U.S”.

Yet, DailyNK found out that such a claim of North Korea is completely different from the fact, and counterfeit dollar bills have still been circulating. Furthermore, DailyNK verified such super-notes have been circulating even in North Korea at 70 dollars.(DailyNK report of July 31st “Counterfeit Dollar Bills, ‘Unofficial but Public Currency’ Circulated in North Korean Market”)

Recently, an information source informed that the counterfeit dollar bills have been distributed via Vietnam. He also said that if the counterfeit dollar bills are blocked from the foreign passages such as Vietnam, they are likely to flow backwards to North Korea. Yet it does not happen yet. The super-notes did not fall in price.

In the meanwhile, in the Intelligence Committee of the National Assembly, Kim Seung Kyu, the Chairman of the National Intelligence Service, revealed that, “A suspect under indictment on a charge of smuggling counterfeit dollar bills by the U.S investigation authority stated he had manufactured super-notes in North Korea at a trial.

▲ On the 25th, the serial number of the super-note that DailyNK purchased in Dandong, China is DB20563913 A ⓒDailyNK
▲ The person in charge of counterfeit dollar bills at Global Standard KEB is distinguishing real bills from counterfeits which DailyNK purchased last January. The real bills have different serial numbers from counterfeit dollar bills ⓒ DailyNK

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , , , ,

Uma resposta to “dinheiro falso super notas O BILL Super Bills, superbill, notas falsas de dólar levaram a mudar nota falsificação de dólar coréia do norte irã TERRORISMO – AS SUPER NOTES! supernotes, como identificar dolár falso,”

  1. andretty Says:

    Gostaria que vc enviasse-me uma foto de nota de cem dólares, agradeço!!!

Comentários encerrados.


%d blogueiros gostam disto: